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INTRODUCTION
A civil case commences when a plaintiff files a complaint in the
forum of his choice. By winning the proverbial “race to the
courthouse,” the plaintiff earns the first choice of where a claim will
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1

be contested. While state courts have general jurisdiction, federal
2
courts have only limited jurisdiction. It is good legal strategy for
parties to seek redress in the forum that is most favorable to their
claims. In general, plaintiffs prefer state courts for their claims,
3
especially when suing large, out-of-state corporations.
In state court, defendants are not without recourse if they are
unsatisfied with a plaintiff’s choice of forum. Even before addressing
the merits of a claim, defendants may attempt to change the forum
4
through, inter alia, declaratory judgment from a federal court, venue
5
6
transfer, forum non conveniens, or, of most significance to this Article,
7
removal to federal court. If a federal court would have original
8
jurisdiction over the claim, the case is eligible for removal.
Plaintiffs anticipating defendants’ removal motion can structure
their state court complaints to increase the chances of remaining in

1. A plaintiff may file his claim in any court that has jurisdiction over the parties
and subject matter involved. See infra Part I.A (discussing a plaintiff’s choice of
forum when filing a case).
2. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2006); see infra Part I.A (describing how federal jurisdiction
is limited to controversies that either deal with a federal question or involve an
amount in question that exceeds $75,000 and is between citizens of different states).
3. See infra Part I.B.2 (explaining why plaintiffs might choose a particular
forum).
4. See 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2006) (allowing a federal district court to “declare the
rights and other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration,
whether or not further relief is or could be sought”).
5. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1404(a), 1406(a). Section 1404 allows a change of venue
“[f]or the convenience of parties and witnesses, [or] in the interest of justice” to
another court “where [the case] might have been brought.” Id. § 1404(a). Section
1406 allows a change of venue “in the interest of justice” or where the filing court is
“in the wrong division or district.” Id. § 1406(a). However, venue transfer is available
only within the same judicial system, so inter-system transfer cannot occur.
See, e.g., Rogers v. Rogers, 688 So. 2d 421, 422 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997) (reversing an
interstate transfer order that was not authorized under state law); United Carolina
Bank v. Martocci, 610 A.2d 484, 487–88 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1992) (holding that
Pennsylvania’s intrastate transfer law does not authorize interstate transfers). For a
proposal allowing inter-state venue transfer, see UNIF. TRANSFER OF LITIG. ACT § 104,
14 U.L.A. 670–72 (2005) (approved and recommended for enactment by the 100th
Annual Conference of the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws, but not yet adopted by any state).
6. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009) (“The doctrine that an
appropriate forum . . . may divest itself of jurisdiction if, for the convenience of the
litigants and the witnesses, it appears that the action should proceed in another
forum in which the action might also have been properly brought in the first
place.”). Because of the lack of inter-state transfer, the court can grant an outright
dismissal, usually after extracting a waiver of personal jurisdiction and any statute of
limitations defenses to ease the filing in the more convenient forum. See, e.g., Piper
Aircraft v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 260–61 (1981) (dismissing a suit in Pennsylvania for
refiling in Scotland, where all witnesses and pertinent evidence were located and
where the plane crash in dispute occurred).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1446; see infra Part I.C (describing how a defendant removes a
case from state to federal court).
8. See infra Part I.C.
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9

state court.
By strategically drafting facially non-removable
complaints, plaintiffs can improve the chances of staving off removal
10
or succeeding with motions to remand. This Article will focus on
11
one such strategy: the ways plaintiffs can structure their defendants.
Specifically, plaintiffs can join a non-diverse defendant, join an
in-state defendant, or join a defendant who will not consent to
12
removal.
13
A plaintiff’s control over case structure is not unlimited. If one
defendant suspects that a co-defendant has been joined solely for the
14
purpose of defeating diversity jurisdiction, that one defendant may
consider basing its remand defense on a claim of “fraudulent
15
joinder.”
Fraudulent joinder is a judicial term of art referring to the
inclusion of a defendant “solely to deprive the [federal] court of

9. See Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir.
2001) (“There are several such bright line limitations on federal removal
jurisdiction . . . that some might regard as arbitrary or unfair. Such limitations,
however, are an inevitable feature of a court system of limited jurisdiction that strictly
construes the right to remove.”).
10. See Great N. Ry. Co. v. Alexander, 246 U.S. 276, 282 (1918) (acknowledging a
plaintiff’s ability to structure his complaint so as to hinder the removability of his
case).
11. In addition to strategies concerning defendants, plaintiffs can, inter alia,
plead an amount-in-controversy under the statutory minimum required for diversity
jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004), or fail to assert viable claims
arising under federal law, U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. For the full text of Article III,
section 2 of the Constitution, see infra note 22.
12. See infra Part I.D (outlining ways plaintiffs may attempt to defeat removal).
13. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001)
(“[A] plaintiff may not defeat a federal court’s diversity jurisdiction and a
defendant’s right of removal by merely joining as defendants parties with no real
connection with the controversy.”).
14. Plaintiffs can attempt to manipulate forum by strategically joining either
plaintiffs or defendants. This Article will focus primarily on the latter situation.
The joinder of additional plaintiffs in hopes of manipulating forum is usually
referred to as “misjoinder.” For a discussion of “fraudulent misjoinder,” see Alan E.
Rothman et al., Advances in Protecting Defendants’ Right to Remove From State to Federal
Court, PROD. LIAB. L. & STRAT., May 2002, at 4 (“A recent tactic has been to piggyback
numerous plaintiffs onto the one plaintiff who has stated a claim against a
nondiverse defendant, notwithstanding their lack of any connection to that
defendant.”).
15. But see Chi., Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. v. Dowell, 229 U.S. 102, 114 (1913)
(finding that the plaintiff’s motive for deciding to sue joint tortfeasors in the same
case was “unimportant”); Arsenault v. Congoleum Corp., No. 01 Civ. 10657 (LLM),
2002 WL 472256, at *5 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 26, 2002) (citing Ill. Cent. R.R. Co. v. Sheegog,
215 U.S. 308, 316 (1909)) (“A motive to prevent removal, by itself, does not render
the joinder of a defendant fraudulent for removal purposes.”); In re Maine Asbestos
Cases, 44 F. Supp. 2d 368, 374 n.2 (D. Me. 1999) (“If the plaintiffs had an objectively
valid basis for joining [the defendant] in the complaint, their subjective motivations
about jurisdiction are of no concern to this court.”).
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16

jurisdiction.” If a defendant can demonstrate fraudulent joinder,
the federal court should ignore that party’s citizenship in the diversity
17
analysis. Thus, a facially non-removable complaint may actually be
18
removable. Currently, courts apply a number of different tests to
19
determine whether fraudulent joinder is present.
This Article
argues that a clearly defined, universally applied standard could
better protect federal subject matter jurisdiction and better ensure
20
that eligible cases have access to federal courts.
Part I of this Article develops the forum debate between plaintiffs
and defendants.
Examining the issues from the plaintiff’s
perspective, this Part addresses the limited scope of federal
jurisdiction before turning to the reasons why that factor can
influence the parties a plaintiff decides to sue. This Part then
discusses three specific ways a plaintiff can prevent removal by
including specific categories of defendants in any case. Part II turns
to the options and opportunities defendants have to influence forum
selection by making an allegation of fraudulent joinder. This Part
discusses four approaches courts have taken when addressing
fraudulent joinder claims. Finally, Part III proposes that courts refine
these standards and implement a uniform, enhanced test to protect
access to federal courts.

16. Kelly v. Drake Beam Morin, Inc., 695 F. Supp. 354, 355 (E.D. Mich. 1988);
see also Schwartz v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 174 F.3d 875, 878 (7th Cir. 1999)
(rejecting the plaintiff’s ability to join an in-state defendant only to defeat diversity
jurisdiction); AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W Television, Inc., 903 F.2d
1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1990) (acknowledging the role of fraudulent joinder in a
plaintiff’s crafting of a complaint); William D. Underwood, Reconsidering DerivativeVenue in Cases Involving Multiple Parties and Multiple Claims, 56 BAYLOR L. REV. 579, 601
(2004) (“Allowing litigants to sue all defendants in a county where any defendant
resides, for example, encourages litigants to sue defendants who have done nothing
wrong simply because they live in a county viewed as a favorable forum.”).
17. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907)
(“[T]he Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a
removal . . . [but] should be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the
Federal court as to permit the state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own
jurisdiction.”); Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213 n.4 (3d Cir. 1995)
(allowing removal where a defendant that did not agree to removal was found to be
fraudulently joined); Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 815 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[A]s a general rule, removal requires the consent of all co-defendants. In cases
involving alleged improper or fraudulent parties, however, application of this
requirement to improperly or fraudulently joined parties would be
nonsensical . . . .”); Sellers v. Foremost Ins. Co., 924 F. Supp. 1116, 1117 (M.D. Ala.
1996) (ignoring the arguments of fraudulently joined defendants when determining
diversity jurisdiction).
18. See, e.g., Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)
(recognizing fraudulent joinder as an exception to complete diversity).
19. See infra Part II.
20. See infra Part III.
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PLAINTIFFS’ STRATEGIES FOR AVOIDING REMOVAL
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
21

The federal courts are courts of limited jurisdiction. Article III of
the U.S. Constitution restricts federal jurisdiction to claims based on
22
a federal question and claims that satisfy diversity jurisdiction.
The Supreme Court has interpreted the latter narrowly, requiring
23
complete diversity and a minimum amount-in-controversy.
Federal jurisdiction is restricted to limit the volume of cases that
federal courts hear and to protect the right of state courts to
24
determine questions of state law. An additional concern over biased
justice, however, influenced the constitutional framers to allow
diversity actions to be heard in federal court regardless of subject

21. See Stephen E. Abraham & William M. Hensley, Remand: One Constitution,
One Standard, 27 PEPP. L. REV. 263, 263 (2000) (presuming that controversies are
outside of a court’s jurisdiction unless parties show proper jurisdiction (citing
McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 182–83 (1936))).
22. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all
Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution . . . [and] to
Controversies . . . between Citizens of different States.”); 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2006)
(granting federal district courts original jurisdiction over all controversies that raise a
question of constitutional or federal law); see also id. § 1332 (granting federal district
courts original jurisdiction over cases where the amount in controversy exceeds
$75,000 and is between citizens of different states).
To determine citizenship, the Constitution instructs that “[a]ll persons born or
naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§ 1. The Supreme Court has combined the requirements of the Fourteenth
Amendment and 28 U.S.C. § 1332 to establish a two-part test to determine
citizenship. See Newman-Green, Inc. v. Alfonzo-Larrain, 490 U.S. 824, 828 (1989)
(“In order to be a citizen of a State within the meaning of the diversity statute,
a natural person must both be a citizen of the United States and be domiciled within
the State.”). Domicile requires a combination of residency and intent to remain
indefinitely. See, e.g., Gordon v. Steele, 376 F. Supp. 575, 577–78 (W.D. Pa. 1974)
(considering both factors in determining a student’s domicile).
23. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (announcing a complete
diversity rule); see also Ruhrgas v. Marathon Oil Co., 526 U.S. 574, 580 n.2 (1999)
(interpreting § 1332 to require complete diversity even though the Constitution
permits federal courts to hear cases between citizens of different states);
Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365, 377 (1978) (recognizing that
Congress created a rule that diversity jurisdiction exists only when there is complete
diversity (citing Healy v. Ratta, 292 U.S. 263, 270 (1934))). For further discussion,
see text and notes infra Part I.D.1.
24. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 109 (1941) (quoting
Healy, 292 U.S. at 270) (“Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they scrupulously
confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the statute has defined.”);
see also B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 548 (5th Cir. 1981) (citing
Am. Fire & Cas. v. Finn, 341 U.S. 6, 18 (1951)) (admonishing that a federal court
that proceeds without jurisdiction disrupts the judicial system).

54

AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 59:49

25

matter. While jurists and legal commentators debate whether such
26
bias still exists today, diversity jurisdiction remains “to shore up

25. United States v. Deveaux, 9 U.S. 61, 87 (1809). In Deveaux, Chief Justice John
Marshall observed:
However, true the fact may be, that the tribunals of the states will administer
justice as impartially as those of the nation, to parties of every description,
it is not less true that the constitution itself either entertains apprehensions
on this subject, or views with such indulgence the possible fears and
apprehensions of suitors, that it has established national tribunals for the
decision of controversies between aliens and a citizen, or between citizens of
different states.
Id.; see also Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 336 (1943) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting) (explaining the belief that state courts would favor their own residents
and show bias against outsiders); Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111 (1898)
(identifying the Framers’ intent to secure a more impartial forum than a tribunal
located in the state where a plaintiff resides). In Federalist No. 80, Alexander
Hamilton stated,
[I]n order to [ensure] the inviolable maintenance of that equality of
privileges and immunities to which the citizens of the Union will be entitled,
the national judiciary ought to preside in all cases in which one state or its
citizens are opposed to another state or its citizens. To secure the full effect
of so fundamental a provision against all evasion and subterfuge, it is
necessary that its construction should be committed to that tribunal which,
having no local attachments, will be likely to be impartial between the
different states and their citizens, and which, owing its official existence to
the union, will never be likely to feel any bias inauspicious to the principles
on which it is founded.
THE FEDERALIST No. 80, at 424 (J.R. Pole ed., 2005).
26. Compare 15 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE—CIVIL
¶ 102.03 (3d ed. 1999) (declaring that the main rationale for diversity jurisdiction is
a need for impartiality in cases involving non-residents who might be prejudiced in
state court (citing Stifel v. Hopkins, 477 F.2d 1116, 1125–26 (6th Cir. 1973))),
and Class Action Fairness Act of 2003: Hearing on H.R. 1115 Before the H. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 108th Cong. 52 (2003) (statement of John H. Beisner, Partner, O’Melveny
& Myers LLP), available at http://commdocs.house.gov/committees/judiciary/
hju87093.000/hju87093_0f.htm (“[T]here can no longer be any question that some
local judges are exhibiting bias against out-of-state defendants . . . the very type of
bias that led to the creation of diversity jurisdiction in the first place.”), with Chi. &
A.R. Co. v. Wiggins Ferry Co., 108 U.S. 18, 24 (1883) (explaining that there is a
presumption that state courts will abide by the Constitution and federal law and that
fear of prejudice is not a sufficient basis for removal), and Buffalo v. Plainfield Hotel
Corp., 177 F.2d 425, 426 n.1 (2d Cir. 1949) (finding that local prejudice or influence
is no longer a valid ground for removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1441).
Regardless of whether out-of-state litigants once had a justifiable fear of disparate
treatment in the local state courts, such fears have likely diminished in modern
times. Henry Friendly, The Historic Basis of Diversity Jurisdiction, 41 HARV. L. REV. 483,
497 (1928) (“[T]here was little cause to fear that the state tribunals would be hostile
to litigants from other states”). Judge Friendly asserted “that the desire to protect
creditors against legislation favorable to debtors was a principal reason for the grant
of diversity jurisdiction, and that as a reason it was by no means without validity.”
Id. at 496–97. Friendly based this conclusion on the reasonable fear that “courts of a
state having laws favorable to debtors would apply these laws in favor of their own
residents even though the debt was payable in another state.” Id. “The Federal
Courts Study Committee, appointed by [then] Chief Justice Rehnquist,
acknowledged that local bias ‘may be a problem in some jurisdictions’ but not
sufficiently so to be a ‘compelling justification’ for retaining diversity jurisdiction in
federal courts.” Victor E. Flango, Litigant Choice Between State and Federal Courts,
46 S.C. L. REV. 961, 965 (1995) (citing SUBCOMM. ON THE ROLE OF THE FEDERAL
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confidence in the judicial system by preventing even the appearance
27
of discrimination in favor of local residents.”
B. Plaintiff as Master of the Case
1.

Forum selection
Forum selection is often the most important strategic decision a
28
party makes in a lawsuit. Forum selection offers an opportunity to
choose not just the geographic location of the proceedings, but also
29
the substantive and procedural laws that will be applied.
By winning the proverbial “race to the courthouse,” plaintiffs have
the ability, within the confines of jurisdictional requirements, to
30
select the forum in which they will attempt to vindicate their rights.
For a plaintiff to gain any advantage from forum selection, he must be
able to bypass one court and select another more favorable to his
31
interests. The reality of modern litigation is that most cases settle,
COURTS AND THEIR RELATION TO THE STATES, REPORT TO FEDERAL COURTS STUDY
COMM. 38 (1990)).
27. John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They’re Making a Federal Case Out of
It . . . In State Court, 25 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 143, 146 (2001) (citing Class Action
Fairness Act of 1999: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Admin. Oversight and the Courts of the
S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 106th Cong. 100 (1999) (statement of Prof. E. Donald Elliot,
Yale Law School)).
28. See Stewart Org., Inc. v. Ricoh Corp., 487 U.S. 22, 38 (1998) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (viewing the increased number of venue cases and the desire to
contractually define venue as evidence of the extreme importance of venue);
Anthony L. Ryan, Principles of Forum Selection, 103 W. VA. L. REV. 167, 168 (2000)
(“The forum in which a case is heard often has considerable influence on the
outcome.”); see also Jennifer Anglim, Crossroads in the Great Race: Moving Beyond the
International Race to Judgment in Disputes over Artwork and Other Chattels, 45 HARV. INT’L
L.J. 239, 239 (2004) (suggesting that a comparison of jurisdictional laws
demonstrates the outcome-determinative character of forums).
29. As one author stated,
The choice of favorable substantive law is the most dramatic prize for the
successful forum-shopper, but there are also many important procedural
distinctions among courts. Less tangible from a theoretical perspective,
but just as real for the practicing lawyer, are differences in the quality and
sympathies of the judge and in the pool from which the jury is drawn.
Ryan, supra note 28, at 200.
30. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392, 395 (1987) (“The rule
makes the plaintiff the master of the claim . . . .”); Fair v. Kohler Die & Specialty Co.,
228 U.S. 22, 25 (1913) (explaining that the one who brings a suit gets to choose what
law courts will apply); Parks v. N.Y. Times Co., 308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962)
(granting the plaintiff the right to choose a forum and whether to join codefendants).
31. See Ryan, supra note 28, at 168–69 (comparing the “plaintiff’s choice”
approach to forum selection with one of “judicial management”). “Judicial
management” is a balancing approach arguing that “an appropriate court—rather
than the plaintiff—should decide what is the proper place of suit.” Id. at 169.
Rather than focusing on one party’s choice, the system is constructed to give both
parties a voice in forum selection. See Recent Case, 83 HARV. L. REV. 465, 469 (1969)
(explaining that diversity jurisdiction and removal jurisdiction work together to give
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32

making a forum victory even more important. In truth, some cases
are worth pursuing in certain jurisdictions, but may lack all value in
33
another courthouse. Therefore, strategy concerning where to file,
34
and when, can have serious repercussions for the success of a claim.
The process of selecting the forum in which to file is often referred
35
to as “forum shopping.” Although forum shopping has a negative
36
connotation, good faith forum shopping is widespread, responsible,
both a plaintiff and a defendant a role in forum selection). Though Ryan’s analysis
suggests that some would prefer a more neutral decision regarding forum,
our system has developed with a preference for the plaintiff as “master of the case.”
See supra note 30 and accompanying text (describing how forum selection allows the
plaintiff to select the applicable law); see also Ryan, supra note 28, at 202 (discussing
the importance of litigating in a favorable jurisdiction).
32. Kevin Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Exorcising the Evil of Forum-Shopping,
80 CORNELL L. REV. 1507, 1508 (1995) (“In the American civil litigation system today,
few cases reach trial. After perhaps some initial skirmishing, most cases settle. Yet all
cases entail forum selection, which has a major impact on outcome.” (citation
omitted)); see also Michael S. Wilk, Mediation of a Bankruptcy Case, 22 AM. BANKR. INST.
J. 12, 12 (May 2003) (“Statistics show that well over 95 percent of all litigation
settles.”).
33. See Stewart Org, Inc., 487 U.S. at 39–40 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (asserting that
plaintiffs might not pursue a suit in a less desirable forum); see, e.g., Taco Bell Corp.
v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp. 528, 530 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (“Attorneys and others in the
legal community viewed cases pending in Duval County as having a higher settlement
value based on a higher probability of a large recovery at trial.”); John MacCormack,
Remote Venue: Plaintiffs’ Pick, NAT’L L.J., Jan. 31, 1994, at 30 (quoting “a San Antonio
defense lawyer” evaluating a particular Texas District by saying “[s]peaking from
painful experience, once a case gets venue down there, its value just explodes”).
34. See Kevin M. Clermont & Theodore Eisenberg, Do Case Outcomes Really Reveal
Anything About the Legal System? Win Rates and Removal Jurisdiction, 83 CORNELL L. REV
581, 593 (1998) (comparing data on winning percentages for originally filed federal
cases versus removed cases). While a plaintiff’s overall “win rate” in federal civil cases
is about fifty-eight percent, Clermont and Eisenberg found that this number
dropped to thirty-four percent in removed diversity cases, as opposed to the
seventy-one percent “win rate” for original diversity cases. Id. Evidence shows that a
steep decline also exists for a plaintiff’s chance of a favorable verdict after transfer of
venue, lending further support to the proposition that forum selection is important.
Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 32, at 1511–12. Specifically, Clermont and
Eisenberg found that, while plaintiffs are victorious in fifty-eight percent of
non-transferred federal court cases, that number drops to twenty-nine percent after
venue transfer. Id. at 1512.
35. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 726 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “forum shopping”
as “[t]he practice of choosing the most favorable jurisdiction or court in which a
claim might be heard”).
36. See Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1677–78 (1990)
(noting “clear derogatory connotations” associated with forum shopping, and
pointing out that “[t]he American legal system tends to treat [forum
shopping] . . . as unethical and inefficient; parties who forum shop are accused of
abusing the adversary system and squandering judicial resources”). Critics have
denounced forum shopping because it “undermines the authority of substantive state
law; . . . overburdens certain courts and creates unnecessary expenses as litigants
pursue the most favorable, rather than the simplest or closest, forum; . . . [and] may
create a negative popular perception about the equity of the legal system.”
Id. at 1684; see also Mary Garvey Algero, In Defense of Forum Shopping: A Realistic Look at
Selecting a Venue, 78 NEB. L. REV. 79, 81 (1999) (referring to forum shopping as
“taboo”); Friedrich K. Juenger, Forum Shopping, Domestic and International, 63 TUL. L.
REV. 553, 553 (1989) (“As a rule, counsel, judges, and academicians employ the term
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37

and expected as a part of modern litigation. In fact, every time a
plaintiff selects a court to file in, they have engaged in some type of
38
forum shopping.
2.

Plaintiffs’ preference for state courts
So long as plaintiffs perceive state courts as more sympathetic
39
forums, they will endeavor to keep their cases there.
In reality,
a case does not receive the same treatment or have the same chance
40
of success in federal court as it does in state court, especially when
41
This is true
local plaintiffs sue large, out-of-state corporations.
‘forum shopping’ to reproach a litigant who, in their opinion, unfairly exploits
jurisdictional or venue rules to affect the outcome of a lawsuit.”); George M. Vairo,
Is Selection Shopping?, NAT’L L.J., Sept. 18, 2000, at A16 (arguing that forum selection
becomes “forum shopping” only when the choice of forum is “frivolous”). Courts in
forum shopping cases sometimes exalt “the twin aims of the Erie rule:
discouragement of forum-shopping and avoidance of inequitable administration of
the laws.” See, e.g., Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 468 (1965) (explaining that the
“outcome-determination” test cannot be interpreted without referring to the Erie
doctrine).
37. J. Skelly Wright, The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law,
13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333 (1967) (“The lack of uniformity in state substantive law,
compounded by proliferation of state long-arm statutes, has made forum-shopping,
among both federal and state courts, a national legal pastime.”).
38. See, e.g., Gulf Oil Corp v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947) (“[U]nless the
balance is strongly in favor of the defendant, the plaintiff’s choice of forum should
rarely be disturbed.”); see also Iowa Pub. Serv. Co. v. Med. Bow Coal Co., 556 F.2d
400, 406 (8th Cir. 1977) (recognizing a plaintiff’s right to join non-diverse
defendants in order to defeat diversity); Ryan, supra note 28, at 168 (“Yet some forum
shopping is considered legitimate—instances where a litigant is entitled to choose
the place of suit.”). Some commentators have taken this proposition a step further
suggesting that “failure to select an advantageous forum may amount to
malpractice.” Juenger, supra note 36, at 572 (citation omitted); see also Algero,
supra note 36, at 112 (“Expecting attorneys to ignore their clients’ best interests by
failing to select a favorable venue when it is available is asking attorneys to commit
malpractice . . . .”).
39. See Heather R. Barber, Developments in the Law: Federal Jurisdiction and Forum
Selection:
Removal and Remand, 37 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1555, 1555 (2004)
(“The presumption is that federal courts are more defendant-friendly.”). As one
author stated,
Attorneys representing nonresidents overwhelmingly prefer to file in federal
court (85 percent of the attorneys identified from a sample of state court
cases and 96 percent of the attorneys identified from a sample of federal
court cases filed in U.S. district court). Conversely, if the opposing client is
not a state resident, most attorneys (70 percent in the state sample and
63 percent in the federal sample) who consider resident status to be
important prefer to file in state courts.
Flango, supra note 26, at 966 (citing Victor E. Flango, Attorney’s Perspectives on Choice of
Forum in Diversity Cases, 25 AKRON L. REV. 41, 63 (1991)).
40. See Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra note 36, at 1695 (“[F]orum shopping
and its results force[] the legal system to confront the uncomfortable fact that the
available forums have recognized biases and inadequacies.”); see also supra notes
25–27 and accompanying text (discussing local bias).
41. It has been argued that local juries view such cases as an opportunity for
wealth redistribution, taking money from large, foreign corporations and giving it to
local plaintiffs. See, e.g., Jerry Mitchell, Jefferson County Ground Zero for Cases, CLARION-
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despite the belief amongst some litigators that “clients receive a
better quality of justice in federal court, even in the enforcement of
42
state law.” Aside from the advantage of litigating in a geographically
convenient forum, plaintiffs filing in state court often hope to exploit
this real or perceived bias.
The jurisdictional decision has its most dramatic impact when the
43
state forum chosen is a so-called “magic jurisdiction.” By filing in an
extremely favorable jurisdiction, plaintiffs “[r]aise the stakes so high
that [defendants] can’t afford to lose or can’t [even] afford to go to
44
trial.” Plaintiffs filing in these jurisdictions raise the value of their
suits and can force defendants into settling even weak claims. Based
on these real and perceived advantages, plaintiffs will strive to keep
their cases in state courts.
C. The Removal Exception
Although plaintiffs get first choice in the forum debate, defendants
may also participate in forum shopping. If the case qualifies, the
LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), June 17, 2001, at 1A (noting that some lawyers have begun
referring to the Jefferson County Courthouse as “the center for the redistribution of
wealth”).
42. Martin H. Redish, Reassessing the Allocation of Judicial Business Between State and
Federal Courts: Federal Jurisdiction and “The Martian Chronicles,” 78 VA. L. REV. 1769,
1800 (1992).
43. See Symposium, A Novel Approach to Mass Tort Class Actions: The Billion Dollar
Settlement in the Sulzer Artificial Hip and Knee Litigation, 16 J.L. & HEALTH 169, 190
(2001–02) (explaining that magic jurisdictions are “venues where they are
well-known for coming in with high plaintiff verdicts”); Jim Copland, The Tort Tax,
WALL ST. J., June 11, 2003, at A16 (“[I]t’s almost impossible to get a fair trial if you’re
a defendant in some of these places . . . . Any lawyer fresh out of law school can walk
in there and win the case, so it doesn’t matter what the evidence or the law is.”
(quoting Richard Scruggs)).
The American Tort Reform Association (“ATRA”) evaluated the country’s worst
“magic jurisdictions” and placed the tag “judicial hellholes” on “places where judges
systematically apply laws and court procedures in an unfair and unbalanced manner,
generally against defendants in civil lawsuits.” AM. TORT REFORM ASS’N, JUDICIAL
HELLHOLES 2007, at ii (2007), available at http://www.atra.org/reports/hellholes/
2007/hellholes2007.pdf. ATRA’s list of “Judicial Hellholes” for 2007 includes: South
Florida; Rio Grande Valley and Gulf Coast, Texas; Cook County, Illinois;
West Virginia; Clark County, Nevada; and Atlantic County, New Jersey. Id. at 5–18.
“Dishonorable Mention” went to Oklahoma; the District of Columbia; the Supreme
Courts of Missouri and Georgia; and the Michigan Legislature. Id. at 25–27.
Knowledge of these jurisdictions is wide-spread; for example, eighty-five percent of
the country’s asbestos cases are filed in just ten jurisdictions. See Lester Brickman,
On the Theory Class’s Theories of Asbestos Litigation: The Disconnect Between Scholarship and
Reality, 31 PEPP. L. REV. 33, 39 n.17 (2003) (explaining that Mississippi, Texas, and
West Virginia have the highest numbers of asbestos cases (citing Robert J.
Samuelson, Asbestos Fraud, WASH. POST, Nov. 20, 2002, at A25)).
44. Benjamine Reid et al., Tobacco Lawyer’s Roundtable: A Report from the Front
Lines, 51 DEPAUL L. REV. 543, 545 (2001) (statement by Richard Scruggs).
“So companies that . . . find themselves on the bull’s-eye of mass court litigation have
very little choice . . . between bankruptcy . . . or trench warfare . . . in some of these
magic jurisdictions.” Id.
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45

defendants can remove it to federal court. To qualify for removal,
a case must satisfy all the requirements that would have allowed it to
46
be filed originally in federal court. Plaintiffs can attempt to return a
47
removed case to state court by filing a motion for remand. While
the removal procedure itself is a fairly straightforward filing of
48
papers, a remand motion forces the federal court to examine the
49
legal validity of federal jurisdiction.
45. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2006) (describing the statutory process of removal
that allows defendants to move a qualifying case, originally filed in state court, to the
corresponding federal court); Hess v. Reynolds, 113 U.S. 73, 81 (1885) (explaining
that the removal statute requires that a suit go to the federal court in the district
where the state case is pending). The Supreme Court has steadfastly protected the
right of defendants to remove a qualifying case to federal court. See infra Part II
(discussing defendants’ ability to remove cases to federal court); see also 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) (requiring that removal occur within thirty days of the time the removing
party receives the document “from which it may first be ascertained that the case is
one which is or has become removable”).
46. See Caterpillar, Inc. v. Williams, 482 U.S. 386, 392 (1987) (stating that only
cases that could have originally been filed in federal court may be removed by a
defendant); Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998)
(“A civil case filed in state court may be removed by the defendant to federal court if
the case could have been brought originally in federal court.”); see also Cochran v.
Montgomery County, 199 U.S. 260, 269 (1905) (noting that cases can only be
removed where diversity of citizenship occurs). Supplemental jurisdiction over a
claim is not sufficient on its own to satisfy this burden. 28 U.S.C. § 1367. Section
1441(c), however, permits that
[w]henever a separate and independent claim or cause of action within the
jurisdiction conferred by section 1331 of this title is joined with one or more
otherwise non-removable claims or causes of action, the entire case may be
removed and the district court may determine all issues therein, or, in its
discretion, may remand all matters in which State law predominates.
28 U.S.C. § 1441(c).
47. See 28 U.S.C. § 1447 (“If at any time before final judgment it appears that the
district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded.”); Russell
Corp. v. Am. Home Assur. Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1043 (11th Cir. 2001) (identifying the
two specific grounds in § 1447(c) for remanding a removed case as “(1) lack of
subject matter jurisdiction; or (2) procedural defect in the removal of the case”);
see also PAS v. Travelers Ins. Co., 7 F.3d 349, 357 (3d Cir. 1993) (upholding a remand
back to state court upon a finding that the federal court only had supplemental
jurisdiction of the case).
48. See 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (requiring a defendant requesting removal to file
“a notice of removal signed pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 and
containing a short plain statement of the grounds for removal, together with a copy
of all process, pleadings, and orders” and serve such documents upon all other
defendants).
49. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see La Flower v. Merrill, 28 F.2d 784, 787 (N.D. Cal.
1928) (“Removal is a federal question under a federal statute, and ‘a motion to
remand is the proper and usual method of testing the sufficiency and regularity of
removal proceedings.’” (quoting Gopcevic v. Cal. Packing Corp., 272 F. 994, 998
(N.D. Cal. 1921))); see also Cameron v. Hodge, 127 U.S. 322, 326 (1888) (holding
that where it can be found that removal was inappropriate, a federal court has a duty
to remand the case back to a state court).
Although the Supreme Court has determined that the substantive rules of a
decision in a diversity action
should be determined by the state law of that forum,
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 305 U.S. 64, 78 (1938), it is federal statutes, and not state
law, that set the criteria for determining when cases may be removed from state to
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Successful removal is difficult because the removing party must
50
overcome a strictly construed burden and a presumption that the
51
Furthermore, plaintiffs often contest
case will be remanded.
removal when possible because evidence shows that defendants fare
52
better by removing their cases to federal court.
D. Strategies to Avoid Removal
Since cases with specific structures of parties are, by rule, not
removable, the savvy plaintiff can select its defendants in such a way
that removal to federal court is impermissible. By including at least
one non-diverse, in-state or non-removing defendant, the plaintiff
creates a state court action that falls outside the limited jurisdiction of
the federal courts and, thus, cannot be removed.

federal court. See United States v. Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947) (holding
that federal courts have jurisdiction to determine their own jurisdiction); Hyde v.
Stone, 61 U.S. 170, 175 (1858) (emphasizing that the jurisdiction of federal courts
cannot be hindered by state laws and that federal courts cannot abandon federal law
in favor of state law regarding removal); see also Grubbs v. Gen. Elec. Credit Corp.,
405 U.S. 699, 705 (1972) (declaring that the removal proceedings of a federal court
are applicable nationwide, regardless of what a state decides).
50. See McNutt v. Gen. Motors Acceptance Corp., 298 U.S. 178, 189 (1936)
(explaining that proper jurisdiction must be maintained throughout the entire
litigation); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990)
(“[A] party who urges jurisdiction on a federal court bears the burden of proving
that jurisdiction exists.”); Sherman v. A.J. Pegno Constr. Corp., 528 F. Supp. 2d 320,
325 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (stating that a party seeking removal bears the burden of
establishing that removal exists as a right). The defendant’s burden is analogous to
the burden placed on the plaintiff who must establish the court’s jurisdiction when
filing the original complaint. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a) (requiring, inter alia, “a short
plain statement of the grounds upon which the court’s jurisdiction depends”).
In Hill v. Gen. Motors Corp., 654 F. Supp. 61, 62 (S.D. Fla. 1987), the court concluded
that the standards for removal should be strictly construed because
(1) [t]he exercise of removal is in derogation of state sovereignty;
(2) jurisdictional allegations for removal are extremely simple for any lawyer
to draft; (3) a liberal construction would promote uncertainty as to a court’s
jurisdiction in marginal cases; [and] (4) 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) is a statute of
repose designed not to unduly delay trials.
51. See Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co., 264 F.3d 1040, 1050 (11th Cir.
2001) (“[T]here is a presumption against the exercise of federal jurisdiction, such
that all uncertainties as to removal jurisdiction are to be resolved in favor of
remand.”); Abels v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 770 F.2d 26, 29 (3d Cir. 1985)
(“[T]he removal statute should be strictly construed and all doubts should be
resolved in favor of remand.”); Jones v. Gen. Tire & Rubber Co., 541 F.2d 660, 664
(7th Cir. 1976) (“It is well established that the burden is on the party seeking to
remove to establish his right and the case should be remanded if there is any doubt
as to the right of removal in the first instance.”); see also McNutt, 298 U.S. at 189
(explaining that the party seeking jurisdiction carries the burden of establishing
jurisdiction throughout the entire litigation).
52. Clermont & Eisenberg, supra note 34, at 599 (listing as benefits of removal:
removing a plaintiff’s lawyer from his favored forum, reducing potential bias,
and eliminating whatever reasons a plaintiff originally had for filing in state court).
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1.

Joinder of a non-diverse defendant
Federal diversity jurisdiction is limited to those cases where all
53
plaintiffs are citizens of different states than all defendants.
Therefore, plaintiffs can prevent removal by joining any non-diverse
54
defendant.
This restrictive standard of “complete diversity” is not
55
The Supreme Court, interpreting the
constitutionally required.
Judiciary Act of 1789, refused to extend federal jurisdiction to cases
56
with only minimal diversity. Although critics argue that complete
diversity is an arbitrary method of restricting access to federal
57
courts, the long-standing nature of its support from the Supreme
Court has entrenched its place in diversity jurisdiction jurisprudence.
To avoid removal, “[p]laintiffs often join non-diverse defendants,
such as local doctors, hospitals, pharmacies, employees and/or sales
58
representatives, in an attempt to defeat diversity jurisdiction . . . .”
53. 28 U.S.C. § 1332; see Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. 267, 267 (1806) (limiting
original federal jurisdiction to those cases where no defendant is a citizen of the
same state as any plaintiff). Note that for the purposes of removal, “the citizenship of
defendants sued under fictitious names shall be disregarded.” 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a).
54. See James F. Archibald III, Reintroducing “Fraud” to the Doctrine of Fraudulent
Joinder, 78 VA. L. REV. 1377, 1377 (1992) (“[A] plaintiff may thwart the efforts of a
diverse defendant seeking removal simply by joining a nondiverse defendant to the
suit.”); see, e.g., B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 554 (5th Cir. 1981)
(“If there is complete diversity between the adverse parties, the defendant is entitled
to a federal forum; but, if the plaintiff and even one properly joined defendant are
residents of the same state, the federal court has no business taking jurisdiction over
the action.”).
55. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2; see also 14A CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3723, at 311–12 (3d ed. 1990) (contending that when the
basis of removal is diversity, complete diversity must exist both at the time the action
is filed in state court and at the time of removal).
56. See Strawbridge, 7 U.S. at 267 (holding that, pursuant to the Judiciary Act of
1789, ch. 20, § 11, 1 Stat. 78, circuit courts have jurisdiction where “the suit is
between a citizen of the state where the suit is brought, and a citizen of another
state”); see also 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, at ¶ 102.12 (explaining that minimal
diversity “would require that only one plaintiff be a citizen of a different state from
that of at least one defendant”).
57. See 15 MOORE ET AL., supra note 26, ¶ 102.12 (“Apart from its obvious
historical pedigree, it is unclear that the complete diversity requirement is any more
rational a means of curbing diversity jurisdiction than an approach premised on the
basis of a litigant’s astrological sign.”).
58. Melissa R. Levin & Heather K. Hays, Fraudulent Joinder: Successful Removal of
Actions to Federal Court, 4 PHARM. & MED. DEVICE L. BULL. 1, 1 (2004); see, e.g., SherwinWilliams v. Holmes County, 343 F.3d 383, 401 (5th Cir. 2003) (allowing a school
district to join a local hardware store in a claim regarding lead paint abatement costs
against an out-of-state paint manufacturer); Dresser, Inc. v. Lowry, 320 F. Supp. 2d
486, 496 (W.D. La. 2004) (permitting the plaintiff to join two local officers of an
out-of-state corporation in an employment discrimination suit); In re Diet Drugs
(Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d
414, 426 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (allowing the plaintiff to join a local doctor in a case
regarding the prescription drug Fen-Phen); Lansdell v. Am. Home Prods. Corp.,
No. CV-99-S-2110-NE, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22540, at *29 (N.D. Ala. Oct. 26, 1999)
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These categories of defendants, in extreme situations and in certain
59
jurisdictions, can find themselves inundated by lawsuits.
2.

Joinder of an in-state defendant
A case may not be removed if any defendant is a citizen of the state
60
in which the case is brought.
Therefore, even where complete
diversity is present, if one defendant is a citizen of the state in which
61
the case is filed, the case is not removable.
This “hometown exception” is consistent with the goal of
62
protecting the limited nature of federal subject matter jurisdiction.
Where a defendant is domiciled in the state or, in the case of a
corporation, has its principle place of business there, such defendant
theoretically will not suffer from the local bias and inconveniences
63
that diversity jurisdiction was developed to confront. By filing suit in
a defendant’s home state, plaintiffs can ensure that a case will not be
removed.
3.

Joinder of a non-removing defendant
In order to remove a multi-defendant case, all defendants must
64
Absent unanimity amongst the
join in the motion for removal.
(permitting the plaintiff to join a local pharmacy in a case regarding the prescription
drug Redux).
59. See, e.g., Class Action Litigation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
108th Cong. 17–19 (July 31, 2002) (statement of Hilda Bankston), available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/congress/senate/pdf/107hrg/87640.pdf.
Bankston’s
family owned and operated the only pharmacy in the once “magic jurisdiction” of
Jefferson County, Mississippi, and was named as a local defendant in hundreds of
lawsuits concerning, inter alia, Fen-Phen, Propulsid, Resulin, and Baycol. Id. at
17–18. Eventually, Bankston was forced to sell her pharmacy because of the cost of
litigation and the stigma of being a permanent defendant. Id. at 18–19; see also supra
note 43 and accompanying text (introducing the concept of “magic jurisdictions”).
60. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b) (2006) (“[An] action shall be removable only if none
of the parties in interest properly joined and served as defendants is a citizen of the
State in which such action is brought.”); see, e.g., Young & Simon, Inc. v. Bernstein,
486 F. Supp. 1012, 1017 (D. Md. 1979) (stating that removal was not available to a
defendant who had been sued in a state court in his state of residence, even if the
plaintiff could have instituted a suit based on diversity of citizenship in federal court
in the same state).
61. See, e.g., Lyall v. AirTran Airlines, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 365, 366, 374 (E.D. Pa.
2000) (remanding from federal court to Pennsylvania state court because one
defendant was a corporation with its principal place of business in Pennsylvania).
62. See supra note 21 and accompanying text (discussing the limited nature of
federal jurisdiction).
63. See supra note 25 and accompanying text (discussing local bias as a
justification for federal jurisdiction).
64. See, e.g., Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Martin, 178 U.S. 245, 247–48
(1900) (interpreting 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a) as requiring the unanimous consent of all
defendants in order to remove a case); Russell Corp. v. Am. Home Assurance Co.,
264 F.3d 1040, 1049 (11th Cir. 2001) (“[T]he law is well settled that in cases
involving multiple defendants, all defendants must consent to the removal of a case
to federal court.”); Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66, 68 (3d Cir. 1985) (“Section 1446
has been construed to require that when there is more than one defendant, all must

2009]

IMPROPER JOINDER

63
65

defendants, the case is remanded to state court.
“Like all rules
governing removal, this unanimity requirement must be strictly
66
interpreted and enforced . . . .”
While one can conceive of legitimate strategy and convenience as
motives for not agreeing to removal, forgoing the right of removal
67
often has little to do with a defendant’s preference for state court.
Further, to ensure a lack of unanimity, plaintiffs may offer a
68
defendant a Non-Removal Agreement. Defendants may do more
than block unanimity by making such agreements; to comply with
Non-Removal Agreements, defendants may neglect to assert a
legitimate affirmative defense, admit all the charges against them,
69
or even change their domicile to establish venue.
In return,
defendants have been offered a cap on damages, reduced liability
based on the amount collected from other defendants, or even a
70
promise not to pursue any judgment against them.
In some
join in the removal petition[.]”); Morganti v. Armstrong Blum Mfg. Co., No. 00-6343,
2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2951, at *11 n.4 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 19, 2001) (“The courts of this
circuit, and the majority of courts nationwide, have interpreted section 1446 to
require that all defendants must expressly join in a notice of removal.”); Williams v.
Howard Univ., 984 F. Supp. 27, 28 (D.D.C. 1997) (adopting the “Three Musketeers
Rule” that “multiple defendants must unambiguously and independently show that
in seeking to remove a case from state court to federal court they are ‘all for one,
one for all’” (citations omitted)).
65. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c); see also Balazik v. County of Dauphin, 44 F.3d 209, 213
(3d Cir. 1995) (“[The] [f]ailure of all defendants to join is a ‘defect in removal
procedure’ within the meaning of § 1447(c) . . . .” (citations omitted)).
66. Russell Corp., 264 F.3d at 1049; see also Sherman v. A.J. Pegno Constr. Corp.,
528 F. Supp. 2d 320, 330 (S.D.N.Y. 2007) (remanding the case to state court and
explaining that all defendants did not affirmatively agree to removal where one
defendant did not join the removal motion, even though he did not object to
removal).
67. For instance, forum selection and choice of law clauses in contracts dictate
the courts in which potential future litigation is to be brought, and such clauses may
function as a waiver of a defendant’s right of removal if the agreed upon location is a
state court. See Russell Corp., 264 F.3d at 1044 (describing cases where the unanimity
requirement was contested).
68. “Non-Removal Agreement” is a term of art referring to any quid pro quo
arrangement where one defendant in a multi-defendant suit agrees to assist a
plaintiff in preventing removal in exchange for some benefit. See id. at 1048 (paving
the way for the validity of non-removal agreements). As the Eleventh Circuit has
explained, “The defendants’ right to remove a case is their right alone. They can
waive it, exercise it, or bargain it away.” Id.
69. See, e.g., Joe v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 845, 847–48 (S.D. Miss.
2003) (explaining that the only party with standing to assert a statute of limitations
affirmative defense declined to do so and “admitted all of the plaintiff’s allegations”
to comply with a Non-Removal Agreement); Taco Bell Corp. v. Cracken, 939 F. Supp.
528, 530 (N.D. Tex. 1996) (involving an incarcerated defendant who had never been
to the “magic jurisdiction” of Duval County, Texas but decided to select it as his
residence and accordingly establish venue there).
70. See, e.g., Hernandez v. Seminole County, 334 F.3d 1233, 1235 (11th Cir. 2003)
(describing an agreement between the plaintiffs and the defendant whereby the
plaintiffs would limit any recovery against the defendant to $250,000 if the defendant
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instances, the defendant’s only participation in the lawsuit is through
71
his assistance to the plaintiffs.
II. DEFENDANT’S RESPONSE: THE “FRAUDULENT JOINDER” CLAIM
Presently, courts take divergent approaches when analyzing claims
72
of fraudulent joinder. Predicting what test a court will apply to
determine fraudulent joinder is difficult, as the standards can shift,
73
even within the same opinion.
In every court, the burden of
proving fraudulent joinder rests with the removing party and is
74
“one of the heaviest burdens known to civil law.” Where fraudulent
joinder is shown, that party’s citizenship will be ignored in
75
determining whether there is diversity jurisdiction.
Four of the standards developed to evaluate fraudulent joinder
bear examination: (1) the “No Possibility” Test; (2) the Rule 11
Standard; (3) the Benefit-Burden Test; and (4) the Summary

agreed to defeat removal from state court, and whereby the plaintiffs agreed not to
pursue their claim against the defendant-doctor in the event that her insurance
carrier refused to provide coverage); In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine,
Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 414, 421 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(describing an agreement by which the plaintiff promised to ultimately dismiss one
group of defendants in exchange for their refusal to consent to removal); Taco Bell,
939 F. Supp. at 530 (describing the agreement between the plaintiff and the
defendant as a “‘high-low’ settlement agreement which limited [the defendant’s]
potential liability . . . contingent upon [plaintiff] obtaining a judgment” against the
other defendants); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Gandy, 925 S.W.2d 696, 698
(Tex. 1996) (describing an agreement between a plaintiff-stepdaughter and a
defendant-stepfather in a sexual abuse action where the plaintiff sued her stepfather
for damages resulting from sexual abuse and agreed never to pursue him personally
for the judgment in hopes of collecting from his insurance company). For
additional examples, see discussion of Mary Carter Agreements infra notes 144–145.
71. Joe, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 849. In another instance, the plaintiff went so far as to
pay $150 per hour to the prisoner-defendant’s attorney and gave a retainer of $1,500,
prior to signing the agreement. Taco Bell, 939 F. Supp. at 530.
72. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003) (“Neither our circuit nor
other circuits have been clear in describing the fraudulent joinder standard.”);
Abraham & Hensley, supra note 21, at 269 (“There is a schism in the federal courts
regarding the standards used to determine whether joinder is fraudulent.”).
73. See, e.g., Travis, 326 F.3d at 647 (“The test has been stated by this court in
various terms, even within the same opinion.”).
74. Strange v. Crum Constr. LLC, No. IP01-0789-C-H/G, 2001 WL 1160952, at *1
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 28, 2001); see also Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel, Co., 257 U.S. 92,
97 (1921) (“[T]he petitioning defendant must take and carry the burden of proof,
he being the actor in the removing proceeding.” (citing Carson v. Dunham, 121 U.S.
421, 425–26 (1887))). For further discussion of the removal burden, see supra note
50 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Wilson, 257 U.S. at 98–99 (upholding the district court’s removal
jurisdiction where the joinder of a local defendant was a sham); Tedder v. F.M.C.
Corp., 590 F.2d 115, 117 (5th Cir. 1979) (stating that if the claim against a local
defendant is deemed fraudulent, lack of diversity will not prevent removal);
14A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3723 (discussing the diversity requirement for
removal).
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76

Judgment Standard. Although some circuits continue without any
clearly articulated test for fraudulent joinder, the “No Possibility” Test
77
has received the widest acceptance.
A. The “No Possibility” Test
In evaluating a claim of fraudulent joinder, many courts apply
78
some form of what this Article refers to as the “No Possibility” Test.
This test requires that the removing party show “either that there is
no possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of
action against the in-state defendant in state court[,] or that there has
been outright fraud in the plaintiff’s pleadings of jurisdictional
79
facts.”
This test, in either identical or similar form, has been
76. See Farish Percy, Making a Federal Case of It: Removing Civil Cases to Federal Court
Based on Fraudulent Joinder, 91 IOWA L. REV. 189, 216 (2005) (describing four tests
used by the circuit courts to analyze allegations of fraudulent joinder: (1) the
reasonable basis for the claim test; (2) the no possibility of recovery test; (3) the no
reasonable possibility of recovery test; and (4) the failure to state a claim test).
77. See, e.g., In re New Eng. Mut. Life Ins. Co. Sales Practices Litig., 324 F. Supp.
2d 288, 298 (D. Mass. 2004) (recognizing that “the Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit has not articulated a standard for evaluating a claim of fraudulent joinder”
but deciding to follow the “well-reasoned opinions” adopting the “No Possibility”
Test); Abraham & Hensley, supra note 21, at 263 (“A few courts, however, have
suggested that the standard for evaluating a remand motion should vary depending
on the nature of the claim.”); Archibald, supra note 54, at 1387–88 (stating that
although the circuits are split concerning the scope of the fraudulent joinder
inquiry, “they agree that the removing party’s burden is to establish that there is
‘no possibility’ that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action in state
court against the nondiverse defendant”).
78. See, e.g., In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 133 F. Supp. 2d 272, 288 (S.D.N.Y.
2001) (applying the “No Possibility” Test); Jay S. Blumenkopf et al., Fighting
Fraudulent Joinder: Proving the Impossible and Preserving your Corporate Client’s Right to a
Federal Forum, 24 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 297, 301–02 (2000) (describing the
“no possibility” standard as requiring no possibility that the plaintiff can establish a
cause of action against the defendant). Some courts and scholars refer to this
approach as “the absolute standard.” See, e.g., Wiacek v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc’y, 795 F. Supp. 223, 226 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (“Some courts require that the
defendant establish that there is absolutely no possibility that the plaintiff could state
a cause of action . . . (the ‘absolute’ standard).”); Alexander O. Ekuo Akpodiete,
Reconciling Plaintiff’s Choice to Sue in State Court with Defendant’s Desire to Defend in
Federal Court, 69 FLA. B. J. 48, 53 (1995) (“This requirement has been dubbed the
‘absolute’ standard by some courts.”).
79. B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981). Other
courts have referred back to the B., Inc. opinion as a reference point for the
“No Possibility” Test. See, e.g., Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538, 1542 (11th
Cir. 1997) (citing B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549) (discussing the standards for removal and
fraudulent joinder); Henderson v. Ford Motor Co., 340 F. Supp. 2d 722, 724, 728
(N.D. Miss. 2004) (citing B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549) (holding that the defendant
successfully demonstrated that there was no reasonable possibility of recovery against
it); Eckhart v. DuPuy Orthopaedics, Inc., No. 2:03-cv-1063, 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
25211, at *5–10 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 3, 2004) (citing B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549) (surveying
the law of fraudulent joinder); Fitzgerald Forest Prods., L.P. v. Durand Raute Corp.
of Or., 932 F. Supp. 293, 295 (M.D. Ga. 1996) (citing B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 549–50)
(analyzing fraudulent joinder standards).
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adopted as the prevailing test in a number of circuits. While courts
have made minor changes to the wording of this test, “they are meant
to be equivalent because each is presented as a restatement of the
81
other.”
82
In B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., the United States Court of Appeals
83
for the Fifth Circuit laid out a model of the “No Possibility” Test.
Applying the test, the court found that it was not fraudulent for a
Texas beer distributor to join the Wisconsin-based Miller Brewing Co.
84
and its Texas-based regional manager.
Resolving all disputed
questions of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff, the court
concluded that “insofar as it is possible that a state court might find
that the Texas defendant(s) were subject to liability, the joinder of
85
one or more of the defendants was not fraudulent.”
Wary of
trespassing on the “judicial ‘turf’ of the state courts,” the Fifth Circuit
86
remanded.
B. The Rule 11 Standard
Like all pleadings, a civil complaint must conform to, inter alia,
87
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11 (“Rule 11”). Rule 11 outlines the
80. The United States Courts of Appeal for the Second, Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, Seventh, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have all adopted the “No Possibility”
Test. See Whitaker v. Am. Telecasting, Inc., 261 F.3d 196, 207 (2d Cir. 2001);
Montano v. Allstate Indemn., No. 99-2225, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6852, at *5 (10th
Cir. Apr. 14, 2000); Crowe v. Coleman, 113 F.3d 1536, 1538 (11th Cir. 1997);
Alexander v. Elec. Data Sys. Corp., 13 F.3d 940, 949 (6th Cir. 1994); Gottlieb v.
Westin Hotel Co., 990 F.2d 323, 327 (7th Cir. 1993); Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp.,
913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990); AIDS Counseling & Testing Ctrs. v. Group W
Television, Inc., 903 F.2d 1000, 1003 (4th Cir. 1990); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co.,
663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
81. Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003); see, e.g., Griggs v. State Farm
Lloyds, 181 F.3d 694, 699 (5th Cir. 1999) (referring at varying points in the opinion
to “absolutely no possibility” and “whether there is any reasonable basis” of
establishing liability against the nondiverse defendant); Bronx Dough, LLC v.
Dunkin’ Donuts, Inc., No. 03 Civ. 1398 (DC), 2004 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 920, at *4
(S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2004) (allowing either “any possibility” or “no reasonable
possibility” to satisfy the “No Possibility” Test).
82. 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981).
83. Id. at 549 (describing the “No Possibility” Test, holding that the defendant
was not fraudulently joined and remanding to state court). For examples of cases in
which other courts adopted a standard that is similar or identical, see cases cited
supra notes 79–80.
84. B., Inc., 663 F.2d at 555.
85. Id. The court was careful to note that its opinion should not be taken as a
comment on the strength of the claims, even warning that a Texas court could find,
as a matter of law, that no valid claim was stated. Id. However, because it was
possible that a valid claim could be stated against the in-state defendants, the federal
courts lacked subject matter jurisdiction. Id.
86. Id. at 554.
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b). Rule 11 provides:
(b) By presenting to the court a pleading, written motion, or other
paper . . . an attorney or unrepresented party certifies that to the best of the
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88

proper standards for submitting papers to the court. Based on these
requirements, some federal courts, most notably the federal district
courts of Alabama, have adopted Rule 11 as the “appropriate
89
threshold standard” for determining fraudulent joinder. In fact,
these courts’ fraudulent joinder analyses are based directly on the
90
language of Rule 11.
91
For example, in Sellers v. Foremost Insurance Co., the Middle District
of Alabama denied a motion for remand because the plaintiff’s
counsel “admitted that he had no evidence whatsoever that supports,
or is likely to lead to evidence that supports, a viable claim against the
92
[in-state defendants].” The court concluded that a failure to satisfy

person’s knowledge, information, and belief, formed after an inquiry
reasonable under the circumstances:
(1) it is not being presented for any improper purpose, such as to harass,
cause unnecessary delay, or needlessly increase the cost of litigation;
(2) the claims, defenses, and other legal contentions therein are warranted
by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for extending, modifying,
or reversing existing law or for establishing new law;
(3) the factual contentions have evidentiary support or, if specifically so
identified, will likely have evidentiary support after a reasonable opportunity
for further investigation or discovery; and
(4) the denials of factual contentions are warranted on the evidence or,
if specifically so identified, are reasonably based on belief or a lack of
information.
88. Rule 11 “require[s] litigants to ‘stop-and-think’ before initially making legal
or factual contentions.” FED. R. CIV. P. 11 advisory committee’s note to 1993
amendment. It also requires an ongoing “duty of candor” towards the court. Id.
89. Sellers v. Foremost Inc., 924 F. Supp. 1116, 1118 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
“[A] fraudulent-joinder charge based on lack of evidence raises a concern already
addressed by Rule 11—that is, that a plaintiff may have good reason to believe that a
fact is true but may need discovery to confirm that fact—Rule 11’s standard should
apply to such a charge.” Id. at 1119; see also Ruffin v. Cong. Life Ins. Co., No. CA
00-0124-C, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7772, at *45 (S.D. Ala. May 11, 2000) (adopting the
Rule 11 Standard as the standard for analyzing fraudulent joinder). Not all of the
Alabama federal judges, however, have accepted this standard. Judge William E.
Cassady of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Alabama has
twice cited Sellers for one portion of his remand evaluation but ignored the Rule 11
Standard in favor of the “No Possibility” Test adopted by the Eleventh Circuit in
Triggs v. John Crump Toyota, 154 F.3d 1284, 1287 (11th Cir. 1998). See Ison
Logging, L.L.C. v. John Deere Constr. Equip. Co., No. CA 99-0979-MJ-C, 2000 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 316, at *8–9 (S.D. Ala. Jan. 10, 2000); Trehern v. Wartsila NSD N. Am.,
Inc., No. CA 99-0016-P-C, CA 99-0549-P-C, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15508, at *11
(S.D. Ala. Aug. 4, 1999).
90. Compare Sellers, 924 F. Supp. at 1119 n.* (“[T]o block a fraudulent-joinder
charge based on lack of legal support, a plaintiff need only show that her claim against a
resident defendant is warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for the
extension, modification, or reversal of existing law or the establishment of new
law.”), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11(b)(2) (“[T]he claims, defenses, and other legal
contentions are warranted by existing law or by a nonfrivolous argument for
extending, modifying, or reversing existing law or for establishing new law.”).
91. 924 F. Supp. 1116 (M.D. Ala. 1996).
92. Id. at 1119.
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such a threshold demanded a finding that the in-state defendants
93
were fraudulently joined.
This test is advantageous because of the case law that exists
94
regarding Rule 11. Courts, however, generally dislike imposing Rule
11 sanctions, and it is therefore unlikely that applying Rule 11 in a
different context, such as fraudulent joinder, would engender
95
judicial support or widespread influence.
C. The Benefit-Burden Test
To determine which parties should be considered for diversity
purposes, some courts have recommended examining only those
96
parties that truly stand to gain or lose from a possible verdict.
93. See id. (denying the plaintiff’s motion to remand to state court and dismissing
the in-state defendants).
94. Id. at 1118.
95. See Algero, supra note 36, at 108 (noting that Rule 11 sanctions are only
imposed for forum shopping where attorneys have ignored an explicit ruling in one
court by seeking an alternative forum); Underwood, supra note 16, at 608 (discussing
the historical reluctance of trial courts to impose sanctions for taking frivolous
positions in litigation); Georgene M. Vairo, Rule 11: A Critical Analysis, 118 F.R.D.
189, 191 (1988) (arguing that attorneys are reluctant to bring Rule 11 sanctions
against an adversary because they probably would employ those tactics themselves).
In fact, in 2004, the United States House of Representatives failed in its attempt to
bolster Rule 11 to combat what it saw as an increasing trend in frivolous lawsuits.
See Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004, H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. (2004).
The House’s approach was to broaden the coverage and strengthen the sanctions
imposed under Rule 11. Id. If enacted, LARA would:
(1) restore mandatory sanctions for filing frivolous lawsuits in violation of
Rule 11, (2) remove Rule 11’s “safe harbor” provision that currently allows
parties and their attorneys to avoid sanctions for making frivolous claims by
withdrawing frivolous claims after a motion for sanctions has been filed,
(3) allow monetary sanctions, including attorneys’ fees and compensatory
costs, against any party making a frivolous claim, (4) allow sanctions for
abuses of the discovery process (the process by which lawyers on each side
request information from the other side prior to trial), (5) apply Rule 11’s
provisions to state cases that a state judge finds affect interstate commerce,
(6) require that personal injury cases be brought only where the plaintiff
resides, where the plaintiff was allegedly injured, or where the defendant’s
principal place of business is located, (7) apply a ““three strikes and you’re
out”“ rule to attorneys who commit Rule 11 violations in Federal district
court, and (8) impose mandatory civil sanctions for willful and intentional
document destruction intended to obstruct a pending court proceeding.
H.R. REP. NO. 108-682, at 3–4 (2004). After passing the House, LARA was referred
to the Senate Judiciary Committee on Sept. 15, 2004, where no further action
was taken. See H.R. 4571: Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of 2004, GovTrack,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bill.xpd?bill=h108-4571 (last visited Sept. 28,
2009).
96. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 464 (1945)
(considering those who would receive any economic benefit or burden from the
verdict), overruled in part on other grounds by Lapides v. Bd. of Regents, 535 U.S. 613
(2002); Bishop v. Hendricks, 495 F.2d 289, 293, 295 (4th Cir. 1974) (finding that,
in order to satisfy § 1359, a party must have more of a stake in the litigation than just
establishing diversity jurisdiction); Rose v. Giamatti, 721 F. Supp. 906, 915–22
(S.D. Ohio 1989) (disregarding nominal parties in determining diversity of
citizenship); see also Peter G. Neiman, “Root, Root, Root for the Home Team”: Pete Rose,

2009]

IMPROPER JOINDER

69

The Supreme Court has authorized the determination of party
validity for diversity jurisdiction by examining only “those parties that
97
stand to be benefited or burdened by the litigation.”
By focusing on those who stand to lose or gain from the cause of
action, this standard “insures that federal jurisdiction will be invoked
only when necessary to protect the party whose personal interest in
98
the suit might be prejudiced by the presence of local bias.” The key
is to “deny[] the use of federal courts in suits which d[o] not really
and substantially involve a dispute or controversy properly within the
99
jurisdiction of the federal courts.”
100
In Ford Motor Co. v. Department of Treasury of Indiana, the Supreme
101
Court applied the Benefit-Burden Test to a jurisdictional question.
Nominal Parties, and Diversity Jurisdiction, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148, 173 (1991) (analyzing
the court’s description in Rose v. Giamatti of a nominal party as “either one who is not
the benefited or the burdened party, or one who has no control over the litigation or
the subject matter”). Many of the cases applying the Benefit-Burden Test to
determine jurisdiction are in the context of appointment or assignment of
representatives to create jurisdiction; however, the principles these cases stand for
are equally applicable to party joinder to destroy jurisdiction. See 13F WRIGHT ET AL.,
supra note 55, § 3641.1 (“Similarly, . . . in cases in which the plaintiff attempts to
defeat . . . jurisdiction by the joinder of a nondiverse plaintiff, the federal courts will
allow the transaction . . . only if that person is deemed a real party in interest.”
(emphasis added)).
97. Neiman, supra note 96, at 164 (citing Ford Motor, 323 U.S. at 464).
Historically, courts applied this test to ignore citizenship of an assignee-plaintiff,
where assignment was made solely to create diversity jurisdiction. See, e.g., Hayden v.
Manning, 106 U.S. 586, 588–89 (1883) (concluding that the out-of-state plaintiff was
only standing in for an in-state resident and that diversity jurisdiction was improperly
created).
98. Bishop, 495 F.2d at 292 (“[This] has been the historical view of why diversity
jurisdiction originated.” (citation omitted)). Essentially, according to the reasoning
behind this standard, allowing parties to affect diversity, other than those who stand
to benefit or lose, “would not advance any of the functions diversity jurisdiction was
designed to serve.” White v. Lee Marine Corp., 434 F.2d 1096, 1100 (5th Cir. 1970);
see supra notes 25–27 and accompanying text (discussing local bias as a justification
for diversity jurisdiction).
99. Bishop, 495 F.2d at 294 (internal quotation marks omitted). In the context of
claim assignment and appointment, the Third Circuit has suggested that
[i]n determining whether or not diversity has been artificially created, the
district court may consider, inter alia, such factors as the identity of the
representative and his relationship to the party represented; the scope of the
representative’s powers and duties; any special capacity or experience which
the representative may possess with respect to the purpose of his
appointment; whether there exists a non-diverse party . . . who might more
normally be expected to represent the interests involved; whether those
seeking the appointment of the representative express any particular reasons
for selecting an out-of-state person; and whether, apart from the
appointment of an out-of-state representative, the suit is one wholly local in
nature.
Groh v. Brooks, 421 F.2d 589, 595 (3d Cir. 1970).
100. 323 U.S. 459 (1945).
101. Id. at 462–64. The plaintiff sued for a refund of allegedly overpaid gross
income taxes, and the defendant asserted an absolute defense of sovereign
immunity. Id. at 460, 462.
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To destroy the State of Indiana’s ability to obtain a dismissal based on
sovereign immunity, the plaintiff joined the Governor, Treasurer,
102
The Court ignored these parties for
and Auditor of the State.
purposes of determining federal jurisdiction, finding that the State
103
itself was the only “real substantial party in interest.”
While the logic of Ford Motor may be instructive on some
propositions, it cannot be directly applied to questions of diversity
jurisdiction. It is well-settled “that a state is not a citizen for purposes
104
of diversity jurisdiction.”
The determination of “real parties in
interest” has great appeal but is unrealistically over-inclusive in some
common situations. Most notably, where the defendant has the right
to seek indemnity from a third party, the third party would be
105
ignored as a “fraudulent” defendant under this standard.
Additionally, a defendant whose liability insurer would be
accountable for any judgment is currently considered the “real party
106
in interest” by the courts, though this test would likely produce the
opposite result.

102. Id. at 460. Combined, these parties constituted the board of the State’s
Treasury Department. Id.
103. Id. at 464. The Court stated that any “[j]udgment obtained in such action is
to be satisfied by payment out of any funds in the state treasury[]” and concluded
that the other defendants were “joined as the collective representatives of the state,
not as individuals against whom a personal judgment is sought.” Id. at 463–64.
The court in Bishop engaged in a similar analysis. See 495 F.2d at 291 (stating that the
“federal courts on jurisdictional issues should assess the substantive relations between
the parties to the controversy and . . . they should make a realistic determination with
respect to the presence of diversity.” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
The Fourth Circuit has described a diversity-destroying party that should be ignored
as a party “[w]ithout any real or substantial interest in the outcome of the litigation,
[because the party] possesses no stake in the litigation. [The party] has nothing to
gain by the suit . . . if successful, and, if the suit is lost, nothing to lose.” Id. at 295
(internal brackets and quotation marks omitted).
104. West Virginia v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 747 F. Supp. 332, 336 (S.D. W. Va.
1990) (citing Postal Tel. Cable Co. v. Alabama, 155 U.S. 482, 487 (1894));
see also Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693, 717 (1973) (“There is no question
that a State is not a ‘citizen’ for purposes of the diversity jurisdiction.”).
105. Regardless of whether an insurer is a co-defendant or a third party,
the indemnified party would be deemed fraudulent under this test. The current
approaches of some courts conflict with this conclusion. See, e.g., Soper v. Kahn, 568
F. Supp. 398, 403 (D. Md. 1983) (stating that third-party claims for indemnification
and contribution are not separate and independent for purposes of granting
removal jurisdiction). American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Finn established the standard
for determining whether a claim is “separate and independent.” 341 U.S. 6 (1951).
Other courts have interpreted this as “a rule which virtually has sounded the death
knell for removal of ‘separate and independent’ claims in the diversity context.”
Motor Vehicle Cas. Co. v. Russian River County Sanitation Dist., 538 F. Supp. 488,
494 (N.D. Cal. 1981). Therefore, indemnity cases are rarely removable for diversity
of citizenship. Soper, 586 F. Supp. at 403.
106. See, e.g., Saylab v. Harford Mut. Ins. Co., 271 F. Supp. 2d 112, 116 (D.D.C.
2003) (finding that an insurance company does not take on the residence of its
insured for diversity of citizenship analysis).
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Some courts have tied fraudulent joinder analysis directly to the
108
question of summary judgment.
While superficially appealing,
a summary judgment investigation looks too deeply to the merits of
the claim rather than merely investigating the reasonableness of the
109
claim.
The fact that a claim is ultimately unsuccessful in one court does
not mean that it was invalid to bring the claim in that court. For one
thing, the fraudulent joinder standard is much more deferential to
110
plaintiffs. In addition, because fraudulent joinder is a jurisdictional
107. Within this context, the courts treat dismissal, under Rule 12(b)(6), and
summary judgment, under Rule 56(b), identically. For that reason, this Article will
discuss the two standards as one approach under the heading of “Summary
Judgment Standard.” Rule 56(b) sets the standard for summary judgment in favor of
a defendant by providing that “[a] party against whom relief is sought may move at
any time, with or without supporting affidavits, for summary judgment on all or part
of the claim.” FED. R. CIV. P. 56(b). Alternatively, Rule 12(b)(6) asks the court to
dismiss for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
12(b)(6). Courts use these two terms interchangeably when discussing a summary
judgment approach to fraudulent joinder analysis. See In re Avandia Mktg., Sales
Practices and Prod. Liab. Litig., 624 F. Supp. 2d 396, 418 (E.D. Pa. 2009) (finding
that when fraudulent joinder is considered in the 12(b)(6) context, the motion must
be treated as one for summary judgment under Rule 56); Stallworth v. Robinson,
No. 1:06CV537, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 81579, at *5–6 (S.D. Miss. Nov. 6, 2006)
(applying both tests to determine whether joinder was fraudulent).
108. See, e.g., Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1993)
(“[T]he proceeding ‘is similar to that used for ruling on a motion for summary
judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P., Rule 56(b).’” (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted)); Davis v. Prentiss Prop. Ltd., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1115–16 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(stating that “while courts have attempted to clearly restate the fraudulent joinder
standard, . . . [i]t is difficult to identify the distinction between the standard under
Rule 12(b)(6) and some of the earlier-cited formulations of the fraudulent-joinder
inquiry”); see also Batoff v. State Farm Ins. Co., 977 F.2d 848, 852 (3d Cir. 1992)
(criticizing the district court because “while the court did not characterize its analysis
as being the same as it would make on a ruling on a motion to dismiss under Fed. R.
Civ. P. 12(b)(6), that is exactly what it was”).
109. See Batoff, 977 F.2d at 852 (stating that the analysis under Rule 12(b)(6)
“is more searching” than the fraudulent joinder analysis, and that it is possible that a
court may find that a party is not fraudulently joined, but still dismiss that party’s
claim under Rule 12(b)(6)); Lyall v. AirTran Airlines, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 365,
367–68 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[O]ur inquiry must not be too deep. Simply because we
come to believe that, at the end of the day, a state court would dismiss the allegations
against a defendant for failure to state a cause of action does not mean that the
defendant’s joinder was fraudulent.”).
110. See Montano v. Allstate Indem., No. 99-2225, 2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 6852, at
*5 (10th Cir. Apr. 14, 2000) (stating that the standard for fraudulent joinder is
stricter than the standard for dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)); Asperger v.
Shop Vac Corp., 524 F. Supp. 2d 1088, 1096 (S.D. Ill. 2007) (declining to conduct a
veil-piercing analysis to determine whether joinder was fraudulent, and observing
that “the inquiry on a claim of fraudulent joinder is even more lenient than the
inquiry on a motion for failure to state a claim . . . under Rule 12(b)(6)”); Grennell
v. W. So. Life Ins. Co., 298 F. Supp. 2d 390, 394 (S.D. W. Va. 2004) (finding the
standard for fraudulent joinder “even more favorable to the plaintiff than the
standard for ruling on a motion to dismiss under” Rule 12(b)(6) (citing Hartley v.
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question, a court is free to consider information outside of the
111
pleadings.
Summary judgment motions, on the other hand, are
112
generally restricted to a facial analysis of the complaint. Currently,
the circuit courts are split on how deeply the court should look to
113
determine the existence of fraudulent joinder.
The Summary Judgment Standard can overstep the jurisdictional
powers of the court. The test’s evaluation of the substantive claim
against a non-diverse party could go beyond the scope of the court’s
114
powers.
While it is well-established that federal courts have the
power to determine their own jurisdiction, federal courts remain
115
courts of limited jurisdiction.

CSX Transp. Inc., 187 F.3d 422, 424 (4th Cir. 1999))); Blumenkopf et al., supra note
78, at 303 (describing the standard for fraudulent joinder as being higher than that
for dismissing a claim under Rule 12(b)(6)).
111. See, e.g., Ross v. Citifinancial, Inc., 344 F.3d 458, 462–63 (5th Cir. 2003)
(observing that for fraudulent joinder analysis, “it is well established that the district
court may ‘pierce the pleadings’”); Brantley v. Vaughan, 835 F. Supp. 258, 261
(D.S.C. 1993) (“[T]he Court is not bound by the allegations of the pleadings,
but may instead consider the entire record, and determine the basis of joinder by any
means available.” (citations and internal quotation marks omitted)). But see Hill v.
Olin Corp., No. 07-cv-0054-DRH, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 34955, at *18, *24 (S.D. Ill.
May 14, 2007) (declining to pierce the pleadings when determining whether joinder
was fraudulent because the remedy should be applied only in exceptional cases).
112. See, e.g., Brantley, 835 F. Supp. at 261 (explaining that on a motion to dismiss
for failure to state a claim, the court does not resolve any dispute, but merely
considers “whether the allegations constitute ‘a short and plain statement of the
claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief’”).
113. 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3641 (explaining the circuit split and
giving an extensive list of cases arguing both sides of the “piercing the pleadings”
debate). Currently, the Fourth, Fifth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits allow
courts to pierce, while the Second, Third, and Seventh Circuits restrict their
examination to the original complaint. Id. Compare Mayes v. Rapoport, 198 F.3d 457,
464 (4th Cir. 1999) (applying the reasoning of the Tenth Circuit, allowing district
courts to look beyond the pleadings to determine if joinder is fraudulent), Smoot v.
Chi., Rock Island & Pac. R.R. Co., 378 F.2d 879, 882 (10th Cir. 1967) (“[F]ederal
courts may look beyond the pleadings to determine if the joinder, although fair on
its face, is a sham or fraudulent device to prevent removal.”); Dodd v. Fawcett
Publ’ns, Inc., 329 F.2d 82, 85 (10th Cir. 1964) (“[U]pon specific allegations of
fraudulent joinder the court may pierce the pleadings, . . . consider the entire
record, and determine the basis of joinder by any means available.”),
and Underwood, supra note 16, at 602 (arguing that courts should be permitted to
pierce the pleadings in all fraudulent joinder cases), with Ala. Great S. Ry. v.
Thompson, 200 U.S. 206, 216 (1905) (requiring that the removal decision be based
solely on the plaintiff’s complaint and other pleadings), and Walton v. Tower Loan of
Miss., 338 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (“[I]t is plain . . . that the improper
joinder standard is far more of a pleadings-based inquiry than had commonly been
assumed as recently as a year ago.”).
114. See Davis v. Prentiss Props. Ltd., Inc., 66 F. Supp. 2d 1112, 1114 (C.D. Cal.
1999) (“If a court were to apply the standard of Rule 12(b)(6) to the diversitydefeating claim, the court would be ignoring the fact that it has no jurisdiction over
that claim.”).
115. See supra Part I.A (discussing the limits of federal jurisdiction); cf. United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 291 (1947) (admonishing that an order
by a federal court that lacks jurisdiction need not be obeyed).
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III. ANALYSIS
Curiously, the use of tactical devices as a means to defeat federal
116
jurisdiction is not expressly prohibited by any statute. Rather than
adopting one universal approach, courts attempt to discern
fraudulent joinder by applying a collection of amorphous
117
approaches. To strengthen the protection of federal subject matter
jurisdiction, courts must clarify and more consistently enforce any
118
standard employed.
First, “fraudulent joinder” is an inappropriate label for the analysis
119
that courts are actually undertaking. Defendants have adopted this
title in an effort to cast a negative glare on joinder that destroys
120
federal subject matter jurisdiction. While the Supreme Court once
required an actual showing of “bad faith” to prove fraudulent
121
joinder, as this Article has discussed above, the standard has
shifted from one of motive to a more intrusive examination of the
possibility of recovery from the allegedly “fraudulently joined”
122
party.
The analysis does not, and should not, revolve around the

116. See 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 55, § 3641 (explaining that 28 U.S.C.
§ 1332(c)(2) defines specific appointment categories through which diversity of
citizenship may be destroyed, but that there are no other rules, statutory or judicial,
that discuss destruction of diversity through other devices).
117. See Travis v. Irby, 326 F.3d 644, 647 (5th Cir. 2003) (observing that the test
courts apply can change, even within the same opinion); Neiman, supra note 96,
at 156 (finding the present standards “poorly defined and thus subject to flexible and
inconsistent interpretation and application”).
118. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186 (1907)
(warning that the federal courts should neither sanction tactics to prevent rightful
removal nor be lax in preventing improper removal); 13F WRIGHT ET AL., supra note
55, § 3641 (explaining that judicial attitudes have shifted to make federal courts
today more wary of transactions that prevent legitimate removal than in years past).
119. See Addison v. Amonate Coal Co., No. 1:08-00221, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
54349, at *5 n.3 (S.D. W. Va. July 16, 2008) (noting that the term “fraudulent
joinder” is misleading because it does not involve a showing of either fraud or
joinder).
120. This strategy of naming is not unlike that used by politicians pushing their
agendas. See, e.g., Lizette Alvarez, In 2 Parties’ War of Words, Shibboleths Emerge as Clear
Winner, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27, 2001, at A1 (comparing Democrats’ use of “vouchers”
and “estate tax” with the Republicans’ “opportunity scholarships” and “death tax”).
The label placed on a concept can craft the debate and influence its outcome. Id.
121. See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 541 (1939) (noting that “[i]t is
always open to the non-resident defendant to show that the resident defendant has
not been joined in good faith”); Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Cockrell, 232 U.S.
146, 152 (1914) (finding that the removing party’s burden is only carried if its proof
“compels the conclusion that the joinder is without right and made in bad faith”).
122. Compare cases cited supra note 121 (actual fraud standard), with B., Inc. v.
Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 545 (5th Cir. 1981) (“No Possibility” Test), Sellers
v. Foremost Ins. Co., 924 F. Supp. 1116, 1119 (M.D. Ala. 1996) (Rule 11 Standard),
Ford Motor Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 323 U.S. 459, 459 (1945) (“Benefit-Burden”
Test), and Jernigan v. Ashland Oil Inc., 989 F.2d 812, 816 (5th Cir. 1993) (Summary
Judgment Standard).
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123

elements of common law fraud. Thus, the name fraudulent joinder
does a poor job of announcing what this standard is striving to
prevent. Rather than joining parties through fraud, plaintiffs are
124
joining parties through improper or collusive means.
It seems
more appropriate, then, to refer to this action as one of “improper
125
joinder.”
A. Defining One Clear Standard for Improper Joinder
Adoption of a uniform test for improper joinder would allow the
126
federal courts to operate more predictably and thus more fairly.
Plaintiffs would benefit from a clearly articulated test to serve as a
guide for how to structure the claims and parties in their lawsuits.
Defendants would also benefit, as such a test would offer clarity on
when a valid removal exists within a facially non-removable case.
127
In this area, the goal should be uniformity across the federal system.
If courts have any hope of creating a fair and effective approach,
a case removable in Maine must also be removable in Georgia.
The uniform test for improper joinder should be based on the
experience gained through use of the four current fraudulent
128
joinder tests and the principles underlying 28 U.S.C. § 1359.
The new standard should require remand where: (1) there is no
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff will be able to establish a cause
123. Fraud is defined as “[a] knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his or her detriment.”
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 731 (9th ed. 2009).
124. Cf. 28 U.S.C. § 1359 (2006) (offering an analogous rule pertaining to the
fraudulent creation of jurisdiction: “A district court shall not have jurisdiction of a
civil action in which any party, by assignment or otherwise, has been improperly or
collusively made or joined to invoke the jurisdiction of such court.”).
125. The Fifth Circuit, en banc, suggested such a name change. Smallwood v. Ill.
Cent. R.R. Co., 385 F.3d 568, 571 n.1 (5th Cir. 2004); see also Walton v. Tower Loan
of Miss., 338 F. Supp. 2d 691, 694 (N.D. Miss. 2004) (referring to the doctrine as
“improper joinder”; Recent Case, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1086, 1091 (2005) (explaining
that a court faced with the question of fraudulent joinder considers whether to
correct “wrongful” joinders, and not whether to punish “fraudulent” behavior).
126. See Clow v. U.S. Dep’t of Hous. & Urban Dev., 948 F.2d 614, 628 (9th Cir.
1981) (O’Scannlain, J., dissenting) (cautioning that a court should not have the
discretion to answer fraudulent joinder questions where that court has no authority
or power to do so).
127. See Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 104 (1941) (“The
removal statute, which is nationwide in its operation, was intended to be uniform in
its application, unaffected by local law definition or characterization of the subject
matter to which it is to be applied.”); see also Forum Shopping Reconsidered, supra note
36, at 1685 (“Consistency of outcomes is a fundamental tenet of virtually any legal
system.” (citing ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS V.3 (D. Ross trans. 1925))).
128. See discussion supra Part II (identifying four fraudulent joinder tests).
The principles underlying § 1359 are instructive with respect to attempts to destroy,
as well as create, jurisdiction through artificial means. See Read v. Phillips Petrol. Co.,
441 F. Supp. 1184, 1185–86 (E.D. La. 1977) (“The aim of Section 1359 is to prevent
improper attempts to manufacture jurisdiction through some artifice.”).
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of action against the defendant; (2) there has been outright fraud in
129
the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdiction; or (3) there is clear and
convincing evidence that the plaintiff does not intend to pursue the
130
diversity-destroying defendant.
One remaining question is what the court should do with an
improper party once such a party is discovered. First, the court
should determine the question of diversity of citizenship without
131
regard to the improper party.
Beyond this, however, the court
should determine whether the improperly joined party should be
severed and remanded, dismissed, or simply retained as a party to the
132
federal case.
If a non-diverse defendant is deemed improperly
joined, the court should sever that party and remand so that the
133
plaintiff can pursue his claim in state court.
Where there is no
reasonable possibility that the plaintiff could establish a cause of
action against the improper party in state court, however, severing
134
the party would seem a waste of time and resources.
Because the
improper joinder standard is more favorable to plaintiffs than
135
a claim failing to satisfy the
the 12(b)(6) motion standard,
136
“no possibility” prong can reasonably be dismissed.
129. Parts 1 and 2 are clear statements of the generally accepted “No Possibility”
Test. See supra Part II.A. Because there is great confusion over what constitutes
“no reasonable possibility,” elaboration on this question is necessary. A good
guidepost for the courts should be whether a plaintiff could make a non-frivolous
response to a motion to dismiss. This would ensure that the claim satisfies Rule 11.
130. See infra Part III.B.
131. See, e.g., Bohanan v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 289 F. Supp. 490,
492 (D. Okla. 1968) (finding that a court must be able to “summarily eliminate [a]
fraudulently joined [d]efendant.”); see also supra notes 18, 85 and accompanying text
(discussing the courts’ prior treatment of fraudulently joined defendants).
132. See In re Rezulin Prods. Liab. Litig., 168 F. Supp. 2d 136, 146 (S.D.N.Y. 2001)
(“Although misjoinder is a ground for dismissal or severance of an improperly joined
party, the vast majority of courts confronting the issue on remand motions have
found that misjoinder . . . is not alone a basis for remand.”).
133. See Joe v. Minn. Life Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 845, 850 (S.D. Miss. 2003)
(severing the diversity-blocking defendants, and suggesting that “[s]hould the
plaintiff actually wish to pursue her claims against these defendants, she may do so in
the courts of the State of Mississippi”). This position is consistent with the handling
of cases of fraudulent misjoinder—the joining of unrelated claims of non-diverse
parties to defeat removal—where the misjoined party is severed pursuant to Rule 21.
See, e.g., Stone v. Zimmer, Inc., No. 09-80252-CIV, 2009 WL 1809990, *3–4 (S.D. Fla.
June 25, 2009) (severing the claims against a misjoined party, pursuant to Rule 21).
134. See supra note 129 and accompanying text (discussing the “no reasonable
possibility” standard). If the standard for the “no possibility” prong is an inability to
make a non-frivolous response to a motion for 12(b)(6), then the plaintiff would
never be able to pursue the severed claim, and it would be reasonable to have the
district court dismiss it. See Marshall v. Manville Sales Corp., 6 F.3d 229, 233 (4th Cir.
1993) (“A claim need not ultimately succeed to defeat removal; only a possibility of a
right to relief need be asserted.”).
135. See cases cited supra note 110 (comparing the fraudulent joinder standard
with the motion to dismiss standard). Rule 12(b)(6) allows for dismissal of a cause of
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The present fraudulent joinder analysis is weakened by a lack of
repercussions for violators. Though statutes contain sanctions for
137
138
abusing the removal process, courts are wary of imposing them.
Following the rationale from the Lawsuit Abuse Reduction Act of
139
2004 (“LARA”), these sanctions should be bolstered and better
enforced to help deter plaintiffs from improperly joining defendants
and thereby help ensure access to federal district courts where
appropriate.
B. No Intention to Pursue
Where it can be demonstrated that there is no intention to pursue
a claim or judgment against a jurisdiction-destroying defendant,
140
a court should find joinder of that party improper.
The Supreme
Court has recognized that courts must protect the right of access to a
141
federal forum for qualifying cases.
In addition, the Court has
recognized that it could lighten the burden of litigation on

action for “failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.” FED. R. CIV. P.
12(b)(6).
136. For an example of a court adopting this conclusion, see Lyall v. Airtran
Airlines, Inc., 109 F. Supp. 2d 365, 368 n.7 (E.D. Pa. 2000) (“[I]f we decide that the
joinder is indeed fraudulent, then we must be prepared to dismiss all claims against
[the improperly joined defendant].”).
137. See, e.g., 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) (2006) (“An order remanding the case may
require payment of just costs and any actual expenses, including attorney fees,
incurred as a result of the removal.”).
138. See Underwood, supra note 16, at 608 (“[T]he historical reluctance of trial
courts to impose sanctions for taking frivolous positions in litigation means that the
threat of sanctions does little to deter litigants from asserting unfounded
claims . . . .”).
139. H.R. 4571, 108th Cong.; see text of proposed law supra note 95.
140. The Supreme Court has included “no intention to pursue” in its fraudulent
joinder analysis. See, e.g., Wilson v. Republic Iron & Steel Co., 257 U.S. 92, 98 (1921)
(“[T]he joinder was a sham and fraudulent—that is, . . . without any purpose to
prosecute the cause in good faith against the [defendant]” and “with the purpose of
fraudulently defeating the [other defendant’s] right of removal.”); Chi., Rock Island
& Pac. Ry. Co. v. Schwyhart, 227 U.S. 184, 194 (1913) (explaining that courts faced
with a fraudulent joinder question should evaluate “whether there was a real
intention to get a joint judgment”). More recently, the Third Circuit, in discussing
the Circuit’s fraudulent joinder standard, used the language “no real intention in
good faith to prosecute the action against the defendant or seek a joint judgment.”
Boyer v. Snap-On Tools Corp., 913 F.2d 108, 111 (3d Cir. 1990).
141. See Wecker v. Nat’l Enameling & Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 182–83 (1907)
(“[T]he Federal courts may, and should, take such action as will defeat attempts to
wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in the Federal courts of the protection of
their rights in those tribunals.”); see also In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine,
Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine) Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D.
Pa. 2002) (“As long as Congress authorizes the federal district courts to exercise
subject matter jurisdiction over diversity actions we must protect the right of parties
to invoke it.”).
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individuals and small businesses located in strategically advantageous
142
forums.
Non-Removal Agreements and similar agreements not to pursue
143
should be per se evidence of improper joinder. These agreements,
144
cast doubt on the
like other collusive litigation agreements,
145
The best approach is to
integrity of the court’s proceedings.
146
declare them void as against public policy.
These agreements are

142. See In re Diet Drugs, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (“What has been transpiring can
only be characterized as a sham, at the unfair expense not only of [this defendant]
but of many individuals and small enterprises that are being unfairly dragged into
court simply to prevent the adjudication of lawsuits against the real target, in a
federal forum.”). For an example of how improper joinder can affect one individual,
see discussion of Hilda Bankston’s story supra note 59. See also supra note 43 and
accompanying text (discussing “magic jurisdictions”).
143. See supra Part I.D.3 (explaining plaintiffs’ use of Non-Removal Agreements to
prevent removal to federal court).
144. See, e.g., Booth v. Mary Carter Paint Co., 202 So. 2d 8 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1967) (discussing, for the first time, “Mary Carter Agreements”). Mary Carter
Agreements are “basically a contract by which one co-defendant secretly agrees with
the plaintiff that, if such defendant will proceed to defend himself in court, his own
maximum liability will be diminished proportionately by increasing the liability of
the other co-defendants.” Ward v. Ochoa, 284 So. 2d 385, 287 (Fla. 1973). Mary
Carter Agreements have four basic elements: “(1) secrecy, (2) the signing defendant
remains in the lawsuit, (3) the signing defendant guarantees plaintiff a certain
monetary recovery, and (4) the signing defendant’s liability is decreased in direct
proportion to the increase in the non-signing defendants’ liability.” Steven Plitt,
The Evolving Boundaries of Damron/Morris Agreements: A Search for the Missing Link, A
Judicial Determination of the Length of a Reasonable Person’s Arm, and Other Progressive
Issues, 35 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 1331, 1339–40 n.50 (2003). Based on the similarities between
Mary Carter Agreements and Non-Removal Agreements, some of the arguments used
to invalidate or criticize the former apply equally to the latter.
145. See Joe v. Minn. Life. Ins. Co., 257 F. Supp. 2d 845, 845 (S.D. Miss. 2003)
(detailing the circumstantial evidence of an apparent agreement in a cynical tone
prior to denying remand); In re Diet Drugs, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 425 (referring to
Non-Removal Agreements as “sham[s]” and as improper efforts to destroy
jurisdiction). The conflicts that led many courts and scholars to condemn Mary
Carter Agreements and similar agreements also apply to Non-Removal Agreements.
Cf. Taylor v. DiRico, 606 P.2d 3, 10 (Ariz. 1980) (explaining that such agreements
“create situations rife with temptation to act dishonestly and collusively”);
Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1993) (holding Mary Carter
Agreements per se invalid because “such agreements tend to mislead judges and juries
and border on collusion”); Steven F. Griffith, Jr., If You Scratch My Back, I’ll Scratch
Yours: Mary Carter Agreements in Louisiana, 45 LOY. L. REV. 725, 741 (1999) (“[T]he
existence of the Mary Carter Agreements alone must cast doubt on the fairness of the
trial[].”); Plitt, supra note 144, at 1339 n.50 (“‘Mary Carter’ Agreements hinder the
search for truth and, to the observation of some courts, border on collusion.”).
146. A number of courts have taken this approach to Mary Carter Agreements.
See, e.g., Dosdourian, 624 So. 2d at 243 (invalidating Mary Carter Agreements); Lum v.
Stinnett, 488 P.2d 347, 351 (Nev. 1971) (finding that agreements to foster litigation
that include a party with no interest in that litigation are contrary to public policy);
Elbaor v. Smith, 845 S.W.2d 240, 250 (Tex. 1992) (declaring Mary Carter
Agreements void and condemning them because they “skew the trial process,
mislead the jury, promote unethical collusion among nominal adversaries, and
create the likelihood that a less culpable defendant will be hit with the full
judgment”); see also June F. Entman, Mary Carter Agreements: An Assessment of Attempted
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difficult to uncover, and parties have an obvious incentive to hide
147
such agreements from the court.
Therefore, defendants must be
given an opportunity to perform minimal discovery to uncover the
148
As “smoking gun”
presence of a Non-Removal Agreement.
evidence may be rare, when determining whether an agreement has
149
been made, the court should consider: (1) the burden of a verdict
150
upon the parties, (2) the reasonableness of pursuing the defendant,
151
and (3) the level of defense the party is undertaking.
Another strategy for curbing the use of Non-Removal Agreements
152
Sanctions could be fashioned under the
is to focus on sanctions.
153
154
Rules of Professional Responsibility and Rule 11.
By adopting a

Solutions, 38 U. FLA. L. REV. 521, 579 (1986) (“The best solution is outright
prohibition of Mary Carter agreements.”).
147. See, e.g., Joe, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (explaining that the court had previously
ordered further discovery to determine why the defendant had been joined,
but noting that “[f]urther discovery ha[d], not unexpectedly, revealed no ‘smoking
gun’”); see also discussion supra note 144 (noting that one of the elements of a Mary
Carter agreement is “secrecy”).
148. See Levin & Hays, supra note 58, at 1 (“In this situation, defense counsel can
explore whether the plaintiff has promised the non-diverse defendant that the
plaintiff will dismiss that defendant after a year—the limit for removal of cases . . . .”);
see, e.g., Joe, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 847 (authorizing discovery to specifically address
whether parties had engaged in an agreement to destroy federal jurisdiction).
149. See, e.g., Joe, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (“From the failure to raise a valid defense,
to provision of a helpful affidavit, and the use of an Answer to assail fellow
defendants in this action, all the evidence points to the conclusion that defendant
[blocking removal] is more aligned with the plaintiff than with the [other]
defendants.”); see also In re Diet Drugs, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (charging that judges
“must not leave their ‘common sense’ outside the courtroom when weighing
evidence”).
150. See supra Part II.C (discussing the Benefit-Burden Test).
151. See Joe, 257 F. Supp. 2d at 849 (recognizing that the plaintiff was seeking
“deep pockets”); In re Diet Drugs, 220 F. Supp. 2d at 422 (“Failure to consent to
removal has occurred even in those jurisdictions in rural Mississippi and the Rio
Grande Valley region of Texas which are well known for their high verdicts for
plaintiffs against corporate defendants.”).
152. See John E. Benedict, It’s a Mistake to Tolerate the Mary Carter Agreement,
87 COLUM. L. REV. 368, 386 (1987) (calling for “severe penalties” for all who attempt
to keep a Mary Carter Agreement hidden from the court).
153. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 8.4(c)–(d) (2004) (“It is
professional misconduct for a lawyer to . . . engage in conduct involving dishonesty,
fraud, deceit or misrepresentation . . . [or] engage in conduct that is prejudicial to
the administration of justice.”). Rule 3.1 restricts a lawyer from bringing a “frivolous”
proceeding. Id. R. 3.1. Comment 1 to Rule 3.1 charges that “[t]he advocate has a
duty to use legal procedure for the fullest benefit of the client’s cause, but also has a
duty not to abuse legal procedure.” Id. cmt. 1. Of more serious consequence may be
Rule 3.3, which requires, inter alia, that “a lawyer shall not knowingly . . . make a false
statement of fact or law to a tribunal.” Id. R. 3.3(a)(1). The Rules warn that lawyers
should avoid even the appearance of impropriety. See Forum Shopping Reconsidered,
supra note 36, at 1690 (citing MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.10 cmt.); see also
Algero, supra note 36, at 106 (arguing that the Model Rules of Professional Conduct
can be used to curb the abuses of forum shopping); Benedict, supra note 152, at 386
n.93 (proposing penalties under the old Model Code of Professional Responsibility
DR 1-102(A)(4)–(5) (1979), which are precursors to modern Rule 8.4.).
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policy that imposes sanctions on those who participate in, or even
offer Non-Removal Agreements, the courts may be able to curb their
155
use.
Once a defendant has been deemed improper because of a
Non-Removal Agreement, the courts must decide how to proceed
156
with that party.
Similar to other forms of improper joinder,
the lack of unanimity should be ignored for purposes of determining
diversity jurisdiction; however, dismissing the claims against the
157
improper party might be more difficult.
The best option may be
for courts to interpret a plaintiff’s Non-Removal Agreement as a
waiver, thereby involuntarily forfeiting the claim, resulting in a

154. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (reproduced in note 87). Once an agreement is made
to exchange non-removal for non-pursuit of claims, it could be argued that no real
cause of action exists between those parties. By failing to alert the court and seeking
removal of that defendant from the case, both the plaintiff’s and the defendant’s
attorneys may be acting in violation of Rule 11 sections 2 or 3. See, e.g., Trampe v.
Wis. Tel. Co., 252 N.W. 675, 676, 678 (Wis. 1934) (finding that the withholding of
information regarding an agreement between the parties “imposed a fictitious suit
upon the court” and that such a suit was “a waste of the court’s time and the public
money”).
155. This approach has been proposed by the House of Representatives in its
efforts to decrease the filing of frivolous claims. LARA, H.R. 4571, 108th Cong. § 6
(2004). The LARA bill reads in part:
THREE-STRIKES RULE FOR SUSPENDING ATTORNEYS WHO COMMIT
MULTIPLE RULE 11 VIOLATIONS.
(a) Mandatory Suspension.—Whenever a Federal district court determines
that an attorney has violated Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
the court shall determine the number of times that the attorney has violated
that rule in that Federal district court during that attorney’s career. If the
court determines that the number is 3 or more, the Federal district court—
(1) shall suspend that attorney from the practice of law in that Federal
district court for 1 year; and
(2) may suspend that attorney from the practice of law in that Federal
district court for any additional period that the court considers appropriate.
(b) Appeal; Stay.—An attorney has the right to appeal a suspension under
subsection (a). While such an appeal is pending, the suspension shall be
stayed.
(c) Reinstatement.—To be reinstated to the practice of law in a Federal
district court after completion of a suspension under subsection (a),
the attorney must first petition the court for reinstatement under such
procedures and conditions as the court may prescribe.
H.R. 4571, § 6.
156. See supra note 149 and accompanying text (discussing the court’s options in
dealing with an improperly-joined party).
157. See, e.g., Bohanan v. Atchison Topeka & Santa Fe Ry. Co., 289 F. Supp. 490,
492 (D. Okla. 1968) (finding that a court must be able to “summarily eliminate [a]
fraudulently joined [d]efendant.”). For an example based on Non-Removal
Agreements, see In re Diet Drugs (Phentermine, Fenfluramine, Dexfenfluramine)
Prods. Liab. Litig., 220 F. Supp. 2d 414, 425 (E.D. Pa. 2002) (“In sum, we disregard
the nonconsent to removal of the phentermine defendants because we find they are
fraudulently joined.”).
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158

However,
dismissal on grounds akin to “failure to prosecute.”
159
if Non-Removal Agreements are deemed unenforceable, a plaintiff
could allege that he did not intend to keep the agreement and would
160
Such deceit
have pursued a judgment against the defendant.
should not be passively condoned by the courts, however, because
allowing these agreements to progress unchecked threatens the
credibility of the judicial process.
CONCLUSION
The courts should adopt a universal standard for improper joinder
that better protects diversity jurisdiction. This three-part standard
should require remand where: (1) there is no reasonable possibility
that the plaintiff can establish a cause of action against a defendant;
(2) the plaintiff’s pleading of jurisdiction contains outright fraud;
or (3) there is clear and convincing evidence that the plaintiff has no
intention to pursue the diversity-destroying defendant. Such a move
would lead to more predictability in the legal system and better
protection of defendants’ right to have legitimately removable claims
heard in federal court.
Unlike other approaches, this test clearly addresses the problem of
Non-Removal Agreements. If allowed to develop unchecked, these
collusive agreements could drastically undermine the fair exercise of
federal subject matter jurisdiction. Federal courts are ones of limited
jurisdiction, but plaintiffs should not be permitted to further limit
access by improper means.

158. See FED. R. CIV. P. 41(b) (explaining that a court should grant an involuntary
dismissal “[i]f the plaintiff fails to prosecute or to comply with these rules or a court
order”).
159. See Underwood, supra note 16, at 625 n.221 (“Whether [litigation]
agreements of this nature are enforceable is not altogether clear.”). Some states
have deemed certain litigation agreements unenforceable because they violate public
policy. See, e.g., Dosdourian v. Carsten, 624 So. 2d 241, 243 (Fla. 1993) (explaining
that such agreements are misleading to judges and juries and are collusive in
nature).
160. Presumably, the defendant could take his chances in a breach of contract
action by basing his claim on the Non-Removal Agreement. This concern
underscores the importance of including guidelines and sanctions pursuant to the
Rules of Professional Conduct. Such a situation is “rife with temptation to act
dishonestly and collusively.” Taylor v. DiRico, 606 P.2d 3, 10 (Ariz. 1980).
This incentive is exactly what led many courts to condemn, or outright ban, Mary
Carter Agreements. See cases cited supra note 145.

